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Abstract
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where
one bidder can achieve a comparative advantage by investment prior
to the auction. We find that, as predicted by theory, bidders invest
more often prior to second price auctions than prior to first price
auctions. In both auction formats bidding is more aggressive than the
equilibrium prediction. However, bidding is closer to equilibrium than
in control treatments where the comparative advantage is exogenous.
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1 Introduction
Different market institutions provide different incentives for firms to engage
in activities that affect their competitive positions. For example, prior to
procurement auctions firms may invest either to reduce their own production
cost, or even to raise the costs of future competitors. Empirical evidence
indicates that companies make use of this possibility extensively.1 Thus,
both, auction rules and investment incentives have to be accounted for when
it comes to compare revenue and efficiency of selling (or buying) institutions.
A number of papers theoretically analyze investment incentives prior to
procurement auctions. Most of them assume that investment decisions are
not observable prior to a competition.2 Then, a typical finding is that invest-
ment is symmetric so that revenue equivalence between market institutions
is preserved also in a model that allows for investment.3 This is not nec-
essarily true if investment is observable. Then, firms strategically react to
the decisions made at the investment stage and it is not immediately clear
whether ex ante symmetry implies symmetric investment. For the case that
only one firm has the possibility to invest, first and second price auctions
with observable investment have been analyzed by Arozamena and Cantil-
lon (2004). They show that equilibrium investment is lower prior to first
price auctions than prior to second price auctions. The reason is that in a
first price auction a bidder’s investment in the own comparative advantage
makes his opponents’ bids relatively more aggressive. This strategic effect
generally diminishes benefits from investment, it can even make investment
undesirable.
In this paper we experimentally investigate investment behavior prior to
first and second price auction markets in a framework that is close to the
model of Arozamena and Cantillon (2004). Throughout the experiment we
run procurement auctions among two subjects each. Subjects played a two
stage game: At the first stage, one subject could invest in order to obtain a
superior distribution of cost (not investing led to symmetry). At stage two,
subjects competed in a procurement auction that was first– or second–price,
depending on the treatment.
As expected, we find that bidding behavior at the auction stage does not
perfectly coincide with equilibrium bidding. In the first price auction, bidders
bid more aggressively than predicted by the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. In
the second price auction about half of the bids are close to equilibrium, while
a rather large fraction of bids is below cost. Both observations are standard in
1De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopolou (2003).
2See Tan (1992), Piccone and Tan (1996), and Bag (1997).
3See Tan (1992).
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the experimental literature on auctions.4 We find, however, that the relative
investment incentives in the two auction formats are preserved given the
observed behavior at the auction stage. That is, investment incentives given
the actual play are still higher in the second price than in the first price
auction, however investment is less profitable than predicted in both formats.
At the investment stage we observe that, in accordance with the theory,
investment is indeed lower prior to first price auctions than prior to second
price auctions. Given the actual play in the auctions, investment is too high
in both formats.
The second focus of our study is the influence of the (existence of an)
investment stage on bidding behavior in the auction. Here we find that
both, the weak and the strong bidder bid less aggressively if the auction has
become asymmetric through an investment decision than in the same asym-
metric auction with an exogenous advantage of the strong bidder. Compar-
ison of several possible explanations for the observed behavior suggests the
conclusion that an investment stage induces the bidders to better reflect the
strategic context which drives the result in the direction of the theoretical
prediction. No evidence is found for behavioral biases as, for example, the
attempt to ”recover” investment cost.
While symmetric single unit first and second price auctions have been
studied extensively in the literature5, very few studies are available on asym-
metric auctions. The one which is closest to ours is Gu¨th et al. (2005)
who study asymmetric first and second price auctions (without an invest-
ment stage) and test the bidders’ preferences for the auction format (FPA
or SPA). For the first price auction their main findings are that, in accor-
dance with the theoretical prediction, weak bidders bid more aggressively
than strong bidders. Both types though bid significantly higher than equi-
librium. For second price auctions they find that, while many players bid
according to their dominant strategy, others overbid significantly. These re-
sults are well in line with our findings. While the second stage of our game is
very close to Gu¨th et al., the focus of our study is on investment incentives in
the two auction formats. This enables us to elicit the value subjects attach
to asymmetry (depending on the auction format). Moreover, we show that
the origin of the asymmetry actually affects bidding behavior at the auction
stage (which theoretically should not be that case). To our knowledge our
study is moreover the first one to analyze bidding behavior in procurement
auctions. While obviously there is a formal equivalence between standard
4See the survey by Kagel (1995).
5See, for example, Kagel’s (1995) extensive survey in the Handbook of Experimental
Economics.
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(asymmetric) auctions and (asymmetric) procurement auctions it is not a
priori clear that actual behavior will be independent of the context. Our
experiment provides evidence that the main results from the literature on
standard auctions extend to the procurement context.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce the theoretical
model that was the basis for our experimental design. The experimental
design is presented in section 3, and our hypotheses in section 4. We report
the results in section 5 and we discuss some behavioral issues in section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Investment Incentives in Procurement
Auctions
2.1 The Game
We consider a two–player, two–stage game where at stage one, one of two
firms (call her firm 1) can affect its relative competitive position and at stage
two both firms (1 and 2) compete in a procurement auction. Production cost
are privately observed by the firms prior to the procurement auction at stage
two.
In what follows, we specify the strategic features of both stages, consid-
ering two alternative auction formats at stage two, a second-price auction
(SPA) and a first-price auction (FPA).
Investment Stage. At the investment stage one of the two firms, say
firm 1, can take a decision that affects its production cost at stage two in a
probabilistic sense. Investment is assumed to be a binary choice to make or
not to make a certain pre–specified investment at cost k. Investment cost
k is observed only by firm 1 prior to the investment decision. Under these
assumptions, firm 1’s decision can be formalized by an investment function
δf1 (k), where δ
f
1 (k) = 1 (δ
f
1 (k) = 0) denotes the decision (not) to invest when
the investment cost is k and the stage two auction format is f . If δf1 (k) =
1 (i. e. firm 1 decides to invest), her production cost at stage two (C1) is
uniformly distributed in [c− w, c]; if δf1 (k) = 0 , C1 is uniformly distributed
in [c, c]. In either case, firm 2’s production cost C2 is drawn uniformly from
[c, c]. In other words, if firm 1 decides not to invest, firms are symmetric at
stage two. In contrast, if firm 1 invests, her production cost is lower in the
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sense of first-order stochastic dominance6 and firms are asymmetric at stage
two.
Auction Stage. Prior to bidding in the auction, costs c1 and c2 are real-
ized according to the relevant distribution.7 Prior to the auction, each firm
observes its own production cost, but not the other firm’s cost. We con-
sider two auction formats: (a) a first price auction (FPA), (b) a second price
auction (SPA).
2.2 Bidding Behavior, Investment Decisions, and
Equilibrium Payoffs
We solve the model by backward induction, starting from stage 2. By analogy
with our experimental conditions, we focus on the case in which c = 300,
c = 400, and w = 100.8
Stage Two: Equilibrium Bid Functions. As for SPA, bidding the
observed production cost is a weakly dominant strategy, independently of
whether firm 1 has invested or not. Thus, we have
bSPAi (ci) = ci, i = 1, 2, (1)
where bfi (ci) is firm i
′s bid function under auction format f , conditional on
her privately observed production cost ci.
As for FPA, equilibrium bid functions differ in the symmetric and the
asymmetric case. In the symmetric case (no investment by firm 1) equilib-
rium bid functions, for both firms, are
bFPAi (ci) =
(c+ ci)
2
, i = 1, 2. (2)
6Note that as we are dealing with procurement auctions the distribution that is first-
order stochastically dominated is advantageous.
7We denote random variables by capitals and realizations by the corresponding lower
case letters.
8While we could solve the model also for general values of our parameters, we believe
that there is little value added by doing so. Using the parameter configuration of the
experiment moreover facilitates interpretation of the data. All our results qualitatively
also hold for different parameterizations.
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In the asymmetric case, equilibrium bid-functions are given by9
bFPA1 (c1) =
200(6c1 − 2600 +
√
520000− 2400c1 + 3c
2
1
3(c1 − 400)
(3)
bFPA2 (c2) =
200(6c2 − 2200−
√
2400c2 − 3c
2
2 − 440000
3(c2 − 400)
(4)
Here bFPA1 (c1) is the bid-function of a firm that has invested and thus, has
the more advantageous cost distribution.
Figure 1: Equilibrium bid functions in the asymmetric FPA.
Comparison of (3) and (4) yields that the advantaged bidder should bid
pointwisely higher than the disadvantaged bidder, i. e. be less aggressive
(recall that we consider a procurement auction), as illustrated by figure 1.
As a consequence, the ex ante disadvantaged bidder may sometimes win the
auction although he observed a higher cost than his opponent. Consequently,
the asymmetric first price auction is inefficient with positive probability.
These bid-functions can be reproduced quite well by piecewise first-order
Taylor expansions of (3) and (4) around expected costs.10 This is why we
will feel justified to use piecewise linear regressions in our analysis of the
9We chose not to state the general bid functions since they are even more complicated
and not very instructive.
10The differences between (3) and (4) and the Taylor expansion is bound below 1.8 for
firm 1 and below 10.5 for firm 2 and it approaches zero rapidly when moving to the center
of the interval.
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experimental data. The numerical expressions of the Taylor expansion are
given approximately by
β1(c1) =
{
285, 39 + 0, 23114c1 +O(c
2
1) if c1 ∈ [200, 300]
222, 37 + 0, 43913c1 +O(c
2
1) if c1 ∈ (300, 400]
(5)
β2(c2) = 169, 49 + 0, 58347c2 +O(c
2
2) (6)
We will later compare these theoretical coefficients with the coefficients
from our regression analysis (see section 5.1).
Stage One: Optimal Investment Decision. Given the above equilib-
rium bid functions at stage 2 we can calculate the optimal investment decision
at stage 1. Whether it is beneficial for a firm to invest or not depends on
how the firm’s competitor reacts. Consequently in order to judge the prof-
itability of an investment, one has to compute the equilibria at stage two
for both the asymmetric case (corresponding to δf1 (k) = 1) and the sym-
metric case (corresponding to δf1 (k) = 0). Investment is profitable whenever
investment cost is smaller than the difference between the expected profits
obtained in case of investing (δ = 1) and in case of investing zero (δ = 0). Let
kˆf denote the (equilibrium) investment cost threshold, under auction format
f ∈ {FPA, SPA} , below which firm 1 should invest.
Optimal investment decision rules, for the two auction formats, are given by
δSPA1 (k)


= 1 if k < kˆSPA =
125
3
∈ {0, 1} if k = kˆSPA
= 0 if k > kˆSPA
(7)
δFPA1 (k)


= 1 if k < kˆFPA = 34
∈ {0, 1} if k = kˆFPA
= 0 if k > kˆFPA
(8)
Note that since kˆFPA = 34 < kˆSPA = 125/3 ≈ 41.67, in FPA investment is
profitable for a smaller range of parameters than in SPA. The reason for this
difference is that in the first price auction investment has a negative strategic
effect (through a change in the opponent’s bidding behavior), which is not the
case in the second price auction. This can be seen from equations (1) to (4):
Investment has no effect on the competitors bidding behavior in SPA, whereas
in FPA it renders the competitor more aggressive in Nash-equilibrium. The
reason is that firm 2 (the firm with the ”worse” cost distribution) expects
tougher competition in the auction than firm 1. Thus, in FPA investment
has a drawback, since it makes the opponent relatively more aggressive.
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Bidders’ Equilibrium Payoffs. Let us finally present the bidders’ equi-
librium payoffs in our two auction formats. Payoff here means overall payoff
of the entire game, including the investment stage. Obviously this payoff will
depend on the cost-threshold kˆf , as well as the cost of investment k and the
format of the auction.
The following table summarizes the firms’ expected equilibrium payoffs
in the first price and in the second price auction.
FPA SPA
firm 1 firm 2 firm 1 firm 2
δf1 (k) = 1 50.6− k 19.4 58.3− k 8.3
δf1 (k) = 0 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6
Note that in the symmetric case, both formats yield the same expected
payoffs.11 In the second price auction investment by firm 1 decreases firm 2’s
payoff considerably, whereas in the first price auction, bidder 2 even benefits
from firm 1’s investment. This is due to the negative strategic effect of
investment.
3 The Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted in 7 sessions in May, 2005. A total of 168
students (24 per session) were recruited among the student population of the
University of Alicante — mainly undergraduate students from the Economics
Department with no (or very little) prior exposure to game theory.
In order to answer our research questions we implemented six different
treatments, as summarized in table 1. We conducted two sessions for each of
the treatments FPA and SPA, one session for each of the treatments EXFPA
and EXSPA, and one session where 12 subjects played COMPFPA and 12
played COMPSPA.
In table 1 FPA and SPA are the treatments that reproduce the theoretical
model presented in Section 2. In treatments EXFPA and EXSPA subjects
had to play only stage 2 in the case of asymmetric cost distributions (i.e. we
reproduced the strategic situation in which firm 1 had previously invested
at stage 1). In treatments COMPFPA and COMPSPA subjects played the
game including the investment stage, but each subject played against a com-
puterized agent who played the equilibrium strategy we just characterized in
Section 2.
11This is due to the revenue equivalence theorem, see e. g. Myerson (1981).
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First Price Auction Second Price Auction
Stage 1: Investment
Stage 2: Auction FPA SPA
(6 indep. obs.) (6 indep. obs.)
Exogenous Advantage
Asymmetric Auction EXFPA EXSPA
(3 indep. obs.) (3 indep. obs.)
Stage 1: Investment
Stage 2: Auction against COMPFPA COMPSPA
computerized agent (12 indep. obs.) (12 indep. obs.)
Table 1: The Experimental Treatments
The 7 experimental sessions were computerized.12 Written instructions
were distributed at the beginning of the experiment and were read aloud. At
the end of the instructional phase, subjects had to answer a set of control
questions, to make sure that they had properly understood the key features of
the experimental environment.13 In the first 6 sessions, subjects were divided
into three cohorts of 8, with subjects from different cohorts never interacting
with each other throughout the session.14 In the last session (the one in which
one firm was computer simulated) we can consider each individual history
as in independent observation. In each session, subjects played one of the 6
treatments for a total 44 rounds. In any given treatment, within each round
t = 1, ..., 44, group composition was randomly determined. By our matching
assignment, each subject played as firm 1 (2) every other round.
Let period τk = {t : 11(k−1) < t ≤ 11k}, k = 1, ..., 4, be the subsequence
of the k−th 11 rounds. Within each period τk , subjects acting as firm 1 ex-
perienced each and every possible investment cost k ∈ K = {0, 5, . . . , 45, 50}.
The sequence of costs was randomly selected within each period and was dif-
ferent for each cohort. After being told the current investment cost k, firm 1
had to decide whether to invest. By this design, we are able to characterize
four complete investment functions δf1 (k), one for each period.
Subjects participating in the experiment received 1.000 ptas. (1 euro is
approx. 166 ptas.) just to show up. These stakes were chosen to exclude
12The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
1999).
13The instructions for FPA, translated into English, can be found in the Appendix.
Instructions for the remaining treatments are available upon request.
14Given this design feature, we shall read the data under the assumption that the history
of each cohort corresponds to an independent observation of the corresponding mechanism.
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the possibility of bankruptcy. Within each round, each subject received
an additional fixed endowment of 10 ptas, while only those who had the
opportunity to invest additionally received a fixed payment equivalent to the
investment cost k that they had in the current round.15 Subjects received,
on average, 18 euros (all included).
After each of the 44 rounds, subjects were informed of the identity of the
stage two auction winner and her own monetary payoffs, as well as all the
cumulated monetary payoff so far. The same information was also given in
the form of a History table, so that subjects could easily review the results of
all the rounds that had been played so far. The experiments took between
60 and 120 minutes (including reading the instructions, answering a post-
experimental questionnaire and receiving payments).
4 Hypotheses and Research Questions
The theoretical analysis of Section 2 yields the following working hypotheses
for our experiment.
(H1) Bidding behavior. In FPA we expect that bidding behavior of strong
bidders is less aggressive than bidding behavior of weak bidders in
the sense that if the two types observe the same production cost, the
strong type’s bid should be higher. In SPA, bidding behavior should
not be affected by the distribution of a bidder’s cost (in the sense that
the equilibrium bid should correspond to the cost, independently on
whether investment has taken place or not).
(H2) Payoffs. In case of no investment on behalf of firm 1, firms’ payoffs
should be the same under both auction formats. This is a consequence
of the revenue equivalence theorem, since in this case both auctions are
symmetric. In case of investment firm 1’s profit should increase and
should be higher than firm 2’s profit in either auction format. Firm
2’s profit decreases in SPA and increases in FPA upon investment of
the other firm (compare section 2.2). From the auctioneer’s point of
view, FPA yields a lower procurement cost than SPA (for our particular
15The reason for this additional payment is that we wanted to compare the bidding
behavior of those bidders who obtained their competitive advantage through investment
with the behavior of bidders who had the same advantage exogenously. Given we payed k
to the investors in advance, a bidder who had invested had the same wealth like a bidder
who received the advantage for free.
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parametrization).16
(H3) Investment behavior. Theoretically, investment incentives are
higher in SPA. In both auctions formats, firm 1 should play a ”thresh-
old” strategy, i. e. she should (not) invest for all values of k below
(above) some fixed threshold kˆf , with kˆSPA > kˆFPA.
(H4) Efficiency. Theory predicts that the allocation is efficient in SPA,
independently of whether bidders are asymmetric or not. In FPA, the
allocation is predicted to be efficient only if firm 1 has not invested
(i. e. the bidders play a symmetric auction).
The data from treatments FPA and SPA allow us to analyze hypotheses
H1 to H4 above, which will be done in the following section 5. The remaining
two treatments have been conducted in order to explore (a) whether the
subjects’ behavior depends on the origin of the comparative advantage, and
(b) to which extent the subjects’ behavior is affected by strategic uncertainty.
Those issues are discussed in section 6.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Bidding behavior (H1)
FPA Figure 2 describes the subjects’ bidding behavior. We take three
snapshots of the data, disaggregating for player position for all observations
in which firm 1 had previously invested (figures 1a) and 1b)), and aggregating
for player position for all observations following a no–investment decision on
behalf of firm 1 (figure 1c).17
All diagrams of figure 2 share the same structure. Every point of the scat-
ter diagram corresponds to a cost-bid pair (i.e. an individual observation),
while the three lines are (i) the equilibrium bid functions derived in Section
2, (ii) a (piecewise) linear regression which estimates the subjects’ aggregate
bid function from the data, and (iii) production cost c (which is reported in
the diagram as a lower bound for any rationalizable bid).
16In general, revenues do not compare in an unambiguous way in asymmetric auctions.
See Maskin and Riley (2000).
17We do not disaggregate for players positions in the no–investment case for two reasons.
First, since in case of not investment, the situation of the two firms is absolutely (ex-ante)
identical; second, because we did not detect any significant difference in behavior (the
corresponding coefficients in the regression are not significant).
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Figure 2: FPA — Stage Two.
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As figure 2 shows, subjects generally bid above cost, but below the equi-
librium prediction, which is in line with most other experimental findings.18
After investing at stage one, firm 1 should be aware of the fact that firm
2’s cost can never fall below 300. As a matter of fact, b1 = 300 seems to a
be a ”focal bid” for cost realizations below 300 (compare figure 1a). This
consideration notwithstanding, we also see a significant proportion of bids
below 300 (6.2% of total observations), although these are observations com-
ing mainly from the first periods (in period 4, only 2.7% of total observations
were bids below 300). While at the beginning of the experiment many strong
types with cost below 300 bid very close to 300, over time those bidders sig-
nificantly increased their bid.19 Over time most strong types seem to learn
to bid closer to the equilibrium prediction. For the weak bidder we can-
not report any significant learning over the periods. According to Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests we could reject the hypothesis that observed bids are equal
to equilibrium bids (p = 0.000) for both, the weak and the strong bidder.
When we compare the theoretical and estimated bid function for the
”strong” player 1, we notice that average bidding behavior falls below the
corresponding equilibrium value. This implies that subjects bid more ag-
gressively than predicted by the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (recall that
we analyze procurement auctions). When we compare figure 1a) with 1c),
we notice that firm 1 bids more aggressively in the ”weak” rather than in the
”strong” position, which is in line with the theoretical prediction. 20
To estimate subjects’ aggregate bid functions, we use a simple random-
effect linear regression. The underlying model assumes that, within each pe-
riod, subjects follow the same (2-piecewise linear, with break fixed at c = 300)
bid function, that differs across periods (individuals) via a fixed (random)
effect. In consequence, the stochastic model includes period dummies and
individual (random) effects and idiosyncratic errors as follows:
bit = α0+β0cit+α1δδ1 +β1δδ1cit+α2δδ1δc++β2δδ1δc+cit+
4∑
k=2
(
γk0 τk + γ
k
1 δkcit
)
+ ǫi+εit,
(9)
where τk denotes period as defined in Section 3, δk, k = 2, 3, 4 are dummies
for period, δδ1 = 1 (δδ1 = 0) if firm 1 has (not) invested at stage 1; δc+ = 1
(δ
c+
= 0) if c ≥ (<)300; ǫi describes the unobserved time-invariant hetero-
geneity which characterizes subject i and εit is an idiosyncratic error term
18See, for example, Kagel (1995), or, for asymmetric auctions, Gu¨th et al. (2005).
19The coefficients of the dummy variables associated with later periods in the piecewise
linear regression reported below are strictly positive and significant at the 5% level.
20This is also found by Gu¨th et al. (2005).
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(we assume that ǫi ⊥ εit).
21 Table 2 reports the estimates of (9).
Figure 3: FPA: Estimated bid functions at stage Two.
Comparing these coefficients with the coefficients from the theoretical pre-
diction as given by (5), we mostly find significant differences. For the strong
type (α0 +α1) is significantly lower than the theoretical prediction while the
hypothesis that (β0 + β1) is equal to the theoretical prediction from (5) can-
not be rejected at the 5% level. Neither can we reject the hypothesis that
α2 equals the theoretical prediction. Both, α0 and β0 are significantly lower
21There are two caveats here. First, note that figure 2 reports separate estimated coeffi-
cients for firm 1 and firm 2. In doing so, we do not control for individual effects common for
both player positions (remember that subjects were alternating roles every other round).
We do so for illustrative purposes (since, by doing so, we greatly simplify the structure of
interactions). All conclusions we report in the paper also hold when the full structure of
interactions is properly taken into accounts (estimations results are not reported here, but
are available upon request). Last, but not least, notice that that equation (9) implicitly
assumes that each individual history corresponds to an independent observation. This
is certainly not applicable in our case, although many details of the experimental design
(such as anonymous and random matching within each cohort) have been especially set
to minimize “repeated game effects”.
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bid FPA SPA
firm 1 firm 2 firm 1 firm 2
110.82*** 125.81*** 124.24*** 168.17***
α0 (16.93) (17.30) (36.00) (48.19)
0.68*** 0.66*** 0.49*** 0.38***
β0 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.14)
132.61*** -31.48** 13.45 -35.34
α1 (18.51) (14.79) (37.03) (38.21)
-0.44*** 0.08* -0.09 0.09
β1 (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.11)
-102.97*** — 21.46 —
α2 (17.79) — (29.86) —
0.37*** — 0.00 —
β2 (0.06) — (0.10) —
2.40 4.22 -9.26 -26.98
γ20 (11.36) (19.46) (19.35) (44.86)
31.73*** 12.11 -66.68*** -96.17**
γ30 (11.27) (19.22) (19.96) (44.03)
44.85*** 37.17** -68.05*** -124.69***
γ40 (11.40) (19.17) (19.20) (45.20)
0.03 -0.01 0.28 0.14
γ21 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13)
-0.05 -0.01 0.28*** 0.37***
γ31 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13)
-0.08 -0.08 0.28 0.46
γ41 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13)
σu 7.94 7.26 29.30 33.43
σe 22.63 17.99 39.97 40.98
ρ 0.11 0.14 0.35 0.40
R2 within 0.6 0.58 0.53 0.28
R2 betw. 0.6 0.10 0.23 0.0
R2 over. 0.59 0.53 0.43 0.18
Table 2: Piecewise linear regression of bid in FPA and SPA on cost with a
break at cost=300 for the strong type. * , ** , ***: significant at 10 %, 5 %,
1%.
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than the theoretical prediction, confirming the fact that bidding behavior of
both types is more aggressive than predicted by theory.
SPA Figure 4 reports the same information as figure 1 with reference to
observations drawn from the SPA sessions.
As figure 4 shows, bidding behavior is much noisier in SPA than in FPA,
in particular (for both player positions) after firm 1 invested in stage one.
As a consequence, the fit of our linear regression falls dramatically (see ta-
ble 2), making the comparison with our theoretical benchmark essentially
meaningless. Such lower levels of R2 ”between subjects”, calls for further
analysis of our evidence, looking at whether high variance in the data has
to be attributed to heterogeneity in our subject pool, rather than heteroge-
nous responses (of each single individual participating in the experiment) to
similar cost levels. As it turns out, subjects were indeed quite heterogenous.
Roughly they can be classified in four types: (i) those who play equilibrium
from the beginning (27%), (ii) those who learn to play equilibrium over time
(25 %), (iii) subjects that almost always underbid considerably (31%), and
(iv) those who alternate over- and underbidding (17%).
Table 3 moreover summarizes the proportions of bids equal to observed
cost +/- 1 %, and above and below, respectively. As table 3 shows, the
percentage of bidders that behaved close to the theoretical prediction mildly
increased over time. Still, more than half of the bidders over– or underbid
their cost even in period 4, where the vast majority underbids their cost
(i.e. runs the risk to incur a loss). Over all periods, we observe 8.9% of
bids below 200, and an additional 24.76% of bids between 200 and 300 that
were more than 10% below the corresponding cost. A large proportion of
the extremely low bids (below 200 ptas.) was due to only three bidders. In
addition the number of bids below 200 is dramatically higher in the case
where an investment has been made. In this case there are 14.6 % firm 1–
bids and 6.4 % firm 2–bids in this range. In the symmetric case (where no
investment has been made) there are only 3 % bids by firm 1 players and
3.5 % bids by firm 2 players below 200. This difference might reflect more
aggressive behavior in the asymmetric case, which is probably also largely
due to individual effects.
The observed behavior at the auction stage is well in line with the ex-
perimental literature. For example Gu¨th et al. (2005) also report that half
of their subjects bid approximately truthfully. Underbidding in their exper-
iment was slightly less prominent. They argue that this is due to the fact
that in their experiments subjects had previously gained experience because
they had to participate in several first price auctions prior to playing SPA.
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Figure 4: SPA — Stage Two.
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underbidding equilibrium bidding overbidding
< cost - 1 % = cost +/- 1 % > cost + 1 %
all periods 49.76 % 41.34 % 8.90 %
period 4 46.21 % 47.35 % 6.44 %
Table 3: Proportions of equilibrium bids and over–/underbidding in SPA
when δ = 1.
Result 1 (Bidding Behavior) (i) In FPA bidding is more aggressive
than the equilibrium prediction for all types. Strong firms learn to bid
closer to equilibrium over time while for weak firms we cannot report
any significant learning.
(ii) In SPA bidding behavior is highly heterogenous. While approximately
half of the subjects bid their cost or learn to do so over time, 50 % of
subjects over- or underbid considerably, where underbidding is by far
the most prominent pattern.
5.2 Payoffs (H2)
Table 4 contains information about average bidder payoffs in FPA and SPA
from the auction at the second stage. Investment cost are not taken into
account.22
FPA SPA
investor opponent investor opponent
δ = 100 observed 29.097 2.261 36.007 -3.160
std. dev. (41.673) (18.492) (57.775) (32.256)
equilibrium 50.6 19.4 58.3 8.3
δ = 0 observed 5.053 6.196 6.693 6.465
std. dev. (18.337) (16.940) (28.143) (25.844)
equilibrium 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6
Table 4: Observed and equilibrium payoffs in FPA and SPA.
In the symmetric case (where no investment took place) there are no
significant differences between FPA and SPA, as predicted by the revenue
equivalence theorem. In both, the symmetric and the asymmetric auctions,
however, subjects bid much more aggressively than theoretically predicted,
22Because investment cost are sunk at the auction stage and should not affect the payoffs
in the auction.
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with the consequence that payoffs are generally lower than their theoretical
values.
In the asymmetric auctions firm 1’s payoff is significantly higher in SPA
than in FPA. While – as predicted – firm 2’s payoff is significantly higher in
FPA than in SPA, also for firm 2 actual payoffs are dramatically lower than
their theoretical predictions. In SPA, firm 2’s average payoff is even negative
(which is due to the excessive underbidding of valuations that we reported in
the previous section). In FPA, firm 2’s payoff should theoretically be higher
than either firm’s payoff in the symmetric case, although in our experiment
the opposite occurs. This is presumably due to the extremely aggressive
behavior of the weak bidders in the FPA format.
Note that comparison of the symmetric and the asymmetric payoffs de-
termines whether investment at stage one is profitable or not. Investment is
profitable whenever the investor’s additional expected payoff in case of invest-
ment is higher than investment cost. The aggregate data (over all periods)
suggest that investment incentives given the observed behavior are smaller
than their theoretical prediction. The critical investment cost suggested by
aggregate data is 24.044 (theoretical prediction: 34) for FPA and 29.314
(theoretical prediction: 41.667) for SPA. Still, according to the observed
payoff differences the relative profitability of investment (which theoretically
is higher in the second price auction) is preserved.
Table 5 finally reports the procurement cost in all four auction types to-
gether with their theoretical predictions. As expected, procurement cost in
both formats is significantly lower if an investment has been made. Revenue
equivalence (i. e. the hypothesis that procurement cost in SPA equals pro-
curement cost in FPA) has to be rejected at the 5% level in either case δf1 = 1
and δf1 = 0.
ENDFPA ENDSPA
δ = 100 observed 327.630 333.024
std. dev. (33.819) (44.620)
equilibrium 354.1 358.3
δ = 0 observed 348.074 353.931
std. dev. (24.985) (32.177)
equilibrium 366.7 366.7
Table 5: Procurement cost in ENDFPA and ENDSPA
Result 2 (Payoffs) (i) Bidder payoffs are significantly lower than their
theoretical predictions both, in the symmetric and the asymmetric auc-
tions. In the symmetric auctions payoffs do not differ in FPA and SPA.
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In the asymmetric auctions bidder payoffs are higher in SPA than in
FPA for firm 1 and vice versa for firm 2.
(ii) Procurement cost is lower in the asymmetric than in the symmetric
auction and among the asymmetric auctions lower in FPA.
5.3 Investment Behavior (H3)
Figure 5 shows the absolute frequency of positive investment decisions in
FPA and SPA for each level of investment cost (over all periods and for
period 4).
Figure 5: Investment behavior in FPA and SPA.
As theory predicts, our subjects’ investment behavior was influenced by
both, the investment cost k, as well as the auction format (FPA or SPA)
, where the probability of investment was significantly higher in SPA. This
seems to suggest that players were able to estimate that the value of such an
investment is higher on average in SPA than in FPA. We observe a clear dy-
namic pattern in the data: while the majority of subjects invested for almost
any level of k in the beginning of the experiment (i.e. invested ”too much”,
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both with respect to equilibrium behavior and expected returns, given bid-
ding behavior at stage 2), they gradually modified their investment behavior
over time, reaching aggregate behavior remarkably close to the theoretical
prediction.
Table 6 reports the predicted cost thresholds from a Logit regression of
the investment decision on investment costs k, for both FPA and SPA
and separately for all periods of the experiment. In addition we report the
threshold given observed bids. This threshold indicates the cost-threshold
a rational optimizing player should choose facing the actual behavior in our
population of experimental subjects.
per1 per2 per3 per4 equil.
FPA 46.71 39.42 34.93 35.88 34
Threshold given obs. bids 15.18 22.78 31.41 26.18
SPA 50 50 44.20 43.60 41.67
Threshold given obs. bids 32.12 26.12 30.22 41.65
Table 6: Predicted cost thresholds from a Logit regression for both FPA and
SPA.
Note that the predicted cost threshold decreases over time until it reaches
35.88 in FPA and 43.60 in SPA. Whereas in the first 22 rounds of FPA (per1
and per2) and the first 33 rounds of SPA (per1-per3) it is significantly higher
than the threshold bidders should have had given the actual bidding behavior
at stage two (see table 6), it is close to this threshold for all other rounds.
The two threshold values (i. e. the actual threshold and the optimal threshold
given average observed behavior) display a tendency to converge towards the
end of the experiment.
Result 3 (Investment) Investment starts out at high levels and over time
approaches the theoretical prediction as well as the threshold given the ob-
served behavior.
5.4 Efficiency (H4)
According to the equilibrium prediction, all auctions but the asymmetric
FPA should yield an efficient allocation, that is, the bidder with the lower
cost should win the auction. Because costs were randomly and indepen-
dently drawn in our experiment, simply comparing treatments with respect
to the achieved production cost would be biased by these random draws. For
this reason, we compare the auction formats with respect to three different
efficiency measures that are aimed to minimize this bias:
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• Allocative Efficiency : the number of efficiently allocated units (i. e. to
the bidder with the lower cost) relative to the total number of units.
• Relative Efficiency Loss : the loss in terms of total production cost
relative to the maximum possible efficiency loss.
• Relative Efficiency : the minimal possible production cost relative to
the achieved total production cost.
Allocative efficiency does not reflect the actual magnitude of efficiency
losses due to misallocations. If the “wrong” bidder obtains a unit, his cost
may be substantially or only slightly above the other bidder’s cost, raising
production cost either dramatically or only slightly. Our second and third
measures take this into account. In table 7 we report for each measure
aggregate results over all pairs and periods, as well as for period 4.
Periods allocative eff. relative eff. loss relative eff.
FPA all 85.99 % 8.46 % 98.08 %
δ = 1 period 4 86.21 % 9.66 % 97.82 %
SPA all 78.88 % 14.16 % 96.83 %
δ = 1 period 4 86.17 % 6.65 % 98.40 %
FPA all 83.62 % 10.04 % 98.98 %
δ = 0 period 4 85.56 % 9.03 % 99.08 %
SPA all 73.59 % 20.46 % 98.01 %
δ = 0 period 4 73,33 % 21.66 % 97.97 %
Table 7: Efficiency, measured by allocative efficiency, relative efficiency loss,
and relative efficiency.
We observe that allocative efficiency (the percentage of Pareto efficient
allocations) is lower in the asymmetric second price auction than in the first
price auction. However, the difference disappears if one considers only period
4. Thus, while the erratic behavior of many subjects in SPA seems to partly
disappear over time, allocative efficiency stays constant in the asymmetric
first price auction, where it coincides with the equilibrium prediction. The
effect appears more pronounced if we look at the relative efficiency loss:
Here, the efficiency loss increases in FPA, while it decreases remarkably in
the asymmetric second price auction.
The remarkably low efficiency values especially for the symmetric SPA
may be due to a small sample size together with a self selection problem:
Since in SPA investment was almost always profitable, the group that played
the symmetric SPA may have contained a large fraction of subjects that did
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not understand this. Overall, the efficiency rates are remarkably close to
those found by Gu¨th et al. (2005), again accounting for the fact that their
SPA-players were more experienced than ours.
Result 4 (Efficiency) Efficiency is initially lower in the asymmetric
SPA than in the asymmetric FPA, which turns around in the course of the
experiment.
6 Behavioral Issues
In this section we evaluate the bidding behavior in our four remaining treat-
ments in order to answer the following two questions: (a) Does the origin of
the comparative advantage matter? and (b) How does the strategic uncer-
tainty affect the subjects behavior? The first question can be answered by
comparison of the behavior in FPA and SPA with the observed play in the
treatments where one subject exogenously received a comparative advantage
(EXFPA and EXSPA). We address the second question by comparing our
results to the treatments where subjects bid against computerized agents
(COMPFPA and COMPSPA).
FPA In order to answer the question whether the origin of the comparative
advantage affects the bidding behavior in the auction, we ran a treatment
where bidders played an asymmetric auction without a preceding invest-
ment stage (EXFPA). That is, one bidder had cost uniformly distributed
in [200, 400] and the other in [300, 400]. This is exactly the situation sub-
jects faced in our original treatments in case the investor actually decided
to invest. Theoretically bidders should behave identically in an asymmetric
auction with exogenous comparative advantage of the strong type and an
asymmetric auction where the asymmetry is due to investment of one bid-
der, as long as strong and weak bidders face the same distributions of cost.
Empirical evidence however suggests that this might not be the case. 23
Table 8 reports estimates of a two-piece wise linear bid function of firm
1 and 2, pooling observations from FPA and EXFPA. We find that in FPA,
bidding is significantly less aggressive than in EXFPA. That is, existence of
an investment stage makes subjects behave closer to the equilibrium predic-
tion. Note that the effect is highly significant for both types of bidders in
period 4, while over all periods the effect is highly significant only for the
23Several experimental studies find that bidders do not strictly follow backward induc-
tion. See Binmore et al. (2001) and the references contained therein.
23
bid strong bidder (firm 1) weak bidder (firm 2)
all periods period 4 all periods period 4
240.122*** 225.266 *** 84.088*** 82.479***
const. (7.333) (12.704) (5.241) (9.811)
.282*** .349*** .789*** .790***
cost (.027) (.049) (.014) (.028)
-113.543*** -85.916*** – –
break (11.349) (19.552) – –
.392*** .293*** – –
c x break (.037) (.065) – –
10.990* 45.118*** 30.039*** 50.536***
ENDFPA (6.189) (9.872) (6.160) (11.617)
-.024 -.116*** -.075*** -.127***
c x ENDFPA (.019) (.032) (.017) (.033)
R2 .664 .717 .793 .784
Table 8: Piecewise linear regression of bid in ENDFPA and EXOFPA on cost
with a break at cost=300 for the strong type (ENDFPA=1 if the treatment
was ENDFPA, 0 in case it was EXOFPA). * , ** , ***: significant at 10 %,
5 %, 1%.
weak type. Strong types seem to adopt the described behavior rather over
time than from the beginning.
According to a piecewise linear regression of the bid in FPA on (among
other variables) investment cost we can moreover reject the hypotheses that
either the bid of the weak or the strong type depends on the level of invest-
ment cost.
All this contradicts the hypothesis that the investment stage directly
affects the investors’ behavior. In particular, the hypothesis that bidding
differs in FPA because bidders want to recover their investment cost has to
be rejected. It is also worth mentioning that behavioral hypotheses arguing
that behavior becomes more aggressive if the comparative advantage is en-
dogenous are clearly rejected by our data.24 It rather seems that both (or
only one) bidders better reflect the strategic context and therefore bids are
closer to the equilibrium prediction.
Finally, a comparison of FPA and COMPFPA reveals that the weak bid-
ders’ behavior in FPA is not distinguishable from behavior in COMPFPA,
while strong types bid significantly more aggressive in FPA than in
24Unlike other authors (Hoffman et al. (1994), Schotter et al. (1996) among many others)
we do not find any evidence of entitlement effects possibly caused by investment.
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bid strong bidder weak bidder
248.378*** 114.103***
const. (8.139) (3.376)
.270*** .713***
cost (.032) (.009)
-115.286*** –
break (14.133) –
.392*** –
c x break (.046) –
35.910*** -.501
COMPFPA (8.784) (7.842)
-.104*** .002
c x COMPFPA (.028) (.022)
R2 .654 .780
Table 9: Piecewise linear regression of bid in ENDFPA and COMPFPA
on cost with a break at cost=300 for the strong type (COMPFPA=1 if the
treatment was COMPFPA, 0 in case it was ENDFPA). * , ** , ***: significant
at 10 %, 5 %, 1%.
COMPFPA. 25 We conclude that the fact that in FPA bidding is closer to
equilibrium is rather due to a reflection of the weak bidders, to which the
strong bidders react.
SPA A categorization in bidding types reveals that there are more ”ratio-
nal” players (i.e. types that play equilibrium from the beginning or learn to
do so over time) in both control treatments (EXSPA and COMPSPA) than
in SPA. This also reflects in the rates of bidders who bid their cost, and
over/underbid, respectively (see table 11). Obviously it is not the strategic
uncertainty that drives the difference, since in COMPSPA bidders do not bid
truthfully more frequently than in EXSPA. A possible explanation could be
that players learn the optimal strategy better whenever a) they play against
more rational players (as is the case in COMSPA) and b) whenever they face
a smaller strategy space and thus a smaller ”cognitive load” (as is the case
in EXSPA).
Result 5 (i) In the asymmetric first price auction bidding is significantly
closer to equilibrium if the asymmetry is endogenous (i. e. generated
25Statistical significance does not change for period 4.
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EQ L U U/O
SPA 27 % 25% 31 % 17 %
EXOSPA 37.5 % 29.2 % 20.8 % 12.5 %
COMPSPA 41.6 % 25 % 25 % 8.3 %
Table 10: Bidder types in SPA (EQ: subjects who bid their cost from the
beginning, L: those who learned the equilibrium over time, U: those who
always underbid, U/O: those who alternated under and overbidding).
treatment underbidding equilibrium bidding overbidding
< cost - 1 % = cost +/- 1 % > cost + 1 %
SPA 49.76 % 41.34 % 8.90 %
EXSPA 33,62% 55,68% 10,7%
COMPSPA 42,23% 51,51% 6,25%
Table 11: Proportions of equilibrium bids and over–/underbidding for the
three SPA treatments — all periods.
by investment). The evidence suggests that the investors’ opponents
better reflect the strategic context which moves bidding of the advantaged
bidder closer to the equilibrium prediction over time.
(ii) In the asymmetric second price auction bidding behavior is closer to
equilibrium in case the asymmetry is exogenous.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have experimentally investigated behavior in first and second
price procurement auctions where one bidder had the possibility to improve
his competitive position by investment. Our results are in line with several
qualitative predictions of the theory. In particular, we observe that
• Subjects invest more often prior to SPA than prior to FPA. Over time
investment levels approach the theoretical prediction, as well as the
optimal threshold given the observed data.
• Procurement cost is lower in the asymmetric FPA than in the asym-
metric SPA (and bidder payoffs are also lower in FPA).
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• In FPA, weak bidders bid relatively more aggressively than strong bid-
ders.
• In those cases where investment had taken place efficiency is initially
lower in SPA. This turns around in the course of the experiment such
that finally efficiency is lower in FPA than in SPA, as predicted.
In line with the experimental literature on auctions, we find that in FPA,
bidding is more aggressive than predicted, resulting in very low bidder pay-
offs and procurement cost. In SPA, bidders are highly heterogenous with
approximately half of them playing close to the equilibrium prediction, while
the majority of the remaining subjects underbid. On average this also leads
to lower bidder payoffs and procurement cost in SPA.
A surprising effect is found when we compare behavior in the auction
games with endogenous asymmetry with two test treatments: In one of them
the asymmetry is exogenous, and in the other one we eliminated strategic
uncertainty since the opponent was simulated by the computer, following the
equilibrium strategy. A comparison suggests that in FPA, in particular weak
bidders better reflect the strategic context if the asymmetry is endogenous.
Over time this leads to bids that are significantly closer to equilibrium in the
treatment with investment than in the treatment with exogenous asymmetry.
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A Optimal Investment - Second Price Auc-
tion
To find the optimal investment decision rule in the second price auction, we
solve the model backwards. Note that the expected payoff of a player 1 is
given by
B(δSPA1 ) = Π12E(C2 − C1|C1 < C2) (10)
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where E denotes the expectations operator and Π12 denotes the proba-
bility for player 1 to win the second auction.26 Obviously both Π12 and
E(C2 −C1|C1 < C2) will depend on whether an investment was undertaken.
Furthermore it is clear that the optimality of such an investment will de-
pend on whether the its cost k is higher or lower than the expected gains it
promises. Evaluating (10) in the two cases δSPA1 = 0 and δ
SPA
1 = 1 yields:
B(0) =
(c− c)
6
B(1) =
7(c− c)
12
− k
Investing will be optimal whenever B(1) > B(0). Consequently the opti-
mal investment decision is:
δSPA1 =


1 if k < 125/3
∈ {0, 1} if k = 125/3
0 if k > 125/3
Optimal Investment Decision - First Price Auction
Analogously the optimal investment decision in the first price auction is
obtained by looking at the expected profits in the auction, which are given
by
B(δFPA1 ) = Π12E(b1(C1)− C1|C1 < C2) (11)
Here b1(C1) is the advantaged’s bidder’s bid-function as given by ( 3) in
the case where δFPA1 = 1 and by (2) in the case where δ
FPA
1 = 0. It follows
in an analogous way to above that the optimal investment rule is given by
δFPA1 =


1 if k < 34
∈ {0, 1} if k = 34
0 if k > 34
B Instructions - FPA
Welcome to the experiment! This is an experiment to study behavior of
people making decisions. We are only interested in observing how people
act on average, not how you act personally. So do not think that we expect
you to behave in any particular way. Be aware that your behavior will affect
the amount of money you win in this experiment. Thus, it is profitable for
26Obviously it is without loss of generality to assume that player 1 has the right to
invest.
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you to act in the best way possible. On the following pages you find the
instructions on how this experiment works and how to use the computer
during the experiment. The instructions are the same for all participants in
the experiment.
Please, do not disturb the other participants during the experiment. If
you need any help, please raise your hand and wait silently. We will attend
you as soon as possible.
How to win money. At the beginning of the experiment, you receive 1000
ptas just for participation. At the end of the experiment you are paid the
amount of money you have won during the experiment in addition to these
1000 ptas.
The game You play 44 rounds of the simple game we explain in the follow-
ing. In every round you play against another PLAYER from this room. This
PLAYER will change in every round. Neither you know whether you have
already interacted with nor does the other PLAYER know whether he has
already interacted with you. This means that your decisions are anonymous
at all times.
At the beginning of each round you receive an initial endowment that
can be different in different rounds. Every round of the game consists of
two phases, an investment phase and a procurement auction phase. Money
you can only win in the procurement auction. The investment phase only
enables one of the two PLAYERS to achieve an advantage in the procurement
auction. The rounds (remember: every round consists of two phases) are
completely independent and nothing you do in one particular round will
influence any of the other rounds.
In the investment phase only one of the two players has the opportunity
to make an investment at a certain expenditure. The investment will lead the
player that has invested to have an advantageous distribution of costs
(we explain later on in detail what that means). You have the opportunity
to invest every two rounds. In the other rounds the other PLAYER has the
opportunity to invest.
In the procurement auction, you and the other PLAYER compete for
the right to undertake a project. You have to bid in order to determine the
winner of the procurement auction and the price to be paid to the winner
for undertaking the project. The PLAYER who places the lower bid wins.
Realization of the project is costly. This cost will change in every round. It is
chosen according to a distribution. Your distribution is the initial distribution
if you did not invest (or if did not have the opportunity to invest) and it is
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the advantageous distribution if you did invest.
If you win the procurement auction, your profit will be the price that is
paid to undertake the project less the cost of undertaking it.
The investment phase In the investment phase only one of the two
PLAYERS (either the other PLAYER or you) has the opportunity to in-
vest. If the PLAYER who can invest does so, he has the advantageous cost
distribution in the procurement auction, while the other one has the initial
distribution. If the PLAYER who has the opportunity to invest decides not
to do so, both players have the initial distribution.
Now we explain in more detail what it means to have an advantageous
distribution.
If the PLAYER who has the possibility to invest decided not to do so,
both PLAYERS have the initial distribution. This means that each PLAYER
has cost between 300 and 400 ptas, where all numbers in this interval are
equally likely.
If the PLAYER who has the opportunity to invest did so, this PLAYER
has the advantageous distribution. This means that the PLAYER has cost
between 200 and 400 ptas, where again all numbers in this interval are equally
likely.
Note that whenever you invest you have a higher probability to have a
low cost, which may lead to a higher probability to make more profits in the
competition.
In any case the PLAYER who could not invest has the initial distribution,
i.e. cost between 300 and 400 ptas.
Investment is costly. The investment expenditure is different in every
round and will only be known to the PLAYER who can undertake the in-
vestment. This is why in every round the PLAYER has to decide again
whether the investment seems profitable to him or not. If he decides to in-
vest, the investment expenditure is deducted from the initial endowment he
has received at the beginning of the round.
In every round, before the procurement auction, both PLAYERS will be
informed about whether the investment has been undertaken or not.
The procurement auction In the second phase of each round both
PLAYERS participate in a procurement auction for a imaginary project.
In every round, the cost of undertaking the project is determined randomly
for each of the PLAYERS according to his distribution (advantageous or
initial). If the PLAYER has the initial distribution his cost is between 300
and 400 ptas. Each number in this interval is equally likely. If he has the
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advantageous distribution his cost is between 200 and 400 ptas. Again, each
number in this interval has the same probability to appear.
Before you decide about your bid, the cost you have in this round appears
on your screen. It indicates the amount of money you have to spend to
undertake the project (in case you win). The other PLAYER will not be
able to observe your cost, nor will you be able to observe his cost. You and
the other PLAYER have to decide on your bids, knowing only your own cost
and the distribution of cost of the other PLAYER. Who gets the project,
and how much money you win depends on your bids as follows.
The procurement auction is always won by the PLAYER who offers to
undertake the project at the lower cost, i. e. the player that places the lower
bid. The winner is paid his bid. Consequently one can interpret the bid of a
player as the amount of money for which he would be willing to undertake
the project. Remember that undertaking the project is costly (you observed
this cost before placing your bid). The PLAYER who wins the procurement
auction has to pay this cost upon undertaking the project. This means that
the winner only makes a positive profit from the procurement auction if the
price he receives is higher than his cost.
The losing player receives no payment in the procurement auction and
incurs no cost.
What does it mean to have an ”advantageous or initial distribu-
tion”? We would like you to focus once more on what it means to have
an advantageous or initial distribution of cost in the procurement auction.
Having the initial distribution means that any number between 300 and 400
ptas has the same probability to appear as your cost in this rounds. With
the advantageous distribution, every number between 200 and 400 ptas will
have the same probability to appear.
advantageous initial
distribution distribution
The probability 400 ptas 100% 100%
to have cost 350 ptas 75% 50%
less than 300 ptas 50% 0%
250 ptas 25% 0%
As you can see in the table the probability to have cost of less then
350 ptas is 50% with the initial distribution. While with the advantageous
distribution the probability to have a cost of less than 350 ptas is higher,
namely 75%.
Note that if you have the advantageous distribution there is a probability
of 50% to have a cost of less then 300 ptas. In this case your cost will be
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lower than the other player’s cost for sure (he has the initial distribution and
thus, a cost between 300 and 400 ptas).
Observe that having the advantageous distribution does not necessarily
imply that you have a lower cost than the other PLAYER. You will only
have a higher probability than with the initial distribution that this is the
case. Having a lower cost allows the PLAYER to place a lower bid and thus,
have a higher probability of winning. Still the identity of the winner and the
profits depends on BOTH bids.27
27The instructions were followed by a number of control questions, and, thereafter, a
short summary of the rules.
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